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The Joint Declaration by the EEC and the CMEA
G6ran Lysen*
I. Introduction
Relations between the European Communities' (EC) and the
Eastern European countries have been frosty until quite recently be-
cause of the hostility Eastern Europe has shown towards the EC.
Eastern European countries have explicitly refused to recognize the
EC under public international law and have made it more difficult for
the EC to participate in international conferences and to conclude
international agreements. One of the Soviet Union's major objec-
tives has been to prevent or delay the formation of any politically or
militarily united body in Western Europe. The economic integration
within the EC was viewed primarily as an adjunct to NATO and as
having its "imperialistic" edge directed against the socialist countries
of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, these circumstances did not pre-
vent smaller Eastern European countries from concluding sectoral
bilateral agreements with the EC when the economic needs of these
countries called for such arrangements.
Discussions between representatives of the EC and of the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance 2 (CMEA or COMECON) took
place from 1974 to 1981 with a view to arriving at some kind of un-
derstanding between the two organizations, but no result was
reached. Substantive changes in East-West relations began in 1986.
In a letter conveyed in June 1985 to Mr. Jacques Delors, President of
the EC Commission, from Mr. Vyacheslav Sychov, Secretary of the
CMEA, the latter proposed a joint declaration establishing official
relations between the two organizations. 3 The EC Commission in-
sisted that such relations were not to limit the development of bilat-
eral relations between the EC and the individual countries of the
Associate Professor of Public International Law, U. of Uppsala, Sweden.
There are three Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Community
(Euratom).
2 The Member States of the CMEA are: the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the
GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (known as the Eastern European members); and
Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam. Yugoslavia, because of its special position in East-West
relations, has observer status with the CMEA. Albania ceased to participate in 1961.
3 18 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) paras. 1.2.9 & 2.3.37-.39 (1985).
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CMEA, 4 a view to, which the CMEA did not object. This issue was
paramount to the EC since there would be no point in having official
relations with the CMEA unless the EC also was recognized by the
European-CMEA countries. 5 On invitation by the Commission,6 the
governments of the European-CMEA countries expressed their
views about normalized relations with the EC and, by the end of May
1986, all had declared themselves ready to establish diplomatic rela-
tions and, where appropriate, to conclude agreements. 7 The EC
Commission's strategy, called the parallel approach, which aimed to
negotiate simultaneously with the CMEA and individual countries
proved to be a success.
The discussions between delegations from the Commission and
the CMEA Secretariat about a Joint Declaration started in the middle
of 1986.8 Negotiations in Geneva and Brussels followed9 and
sucessfully ended in the signing of such a declaration in Luxembourg
on June 25, 1988.10 On this occasion the interested countries of the
CMEA issued a unilateral statement noting that nothing in the Decla-
ration "shall affect [and nothing can] affect the Quadripartite Agree-
ment of 3 September 1971."I l
In November 1986 the Commission was authorized by the EC
Council to open negotiations with Czechoslovakia concerning an
agreement on trade in industrial products. 1 2 The agreement was
signed on December 19, 1988.'1 In April 1987 authorization was
4 18 id. (No. 7/8) para. 2.3.38 (1985); 18 id. (No. 10) paras. 2.3.29-.30 & 2.5.30
(1985); 19 id. (No. 2) para. 2.2.21 (1986).
5 19 id. (No. 2) para. 2.2.21 (1986).
6 Id.
7 19 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 5) para. 2.2.37 (1986).
8 The first meeting took place in Geneva, Switzerland, Sept. 22-24, 1986. 19 id. (No.
9) para. 2.2.27 (1986).
9 20 id. (No. 3) para. 2.2.23 (1987) (meeting of experts to continue examination of
draft agreement in Geneva); 20 id. (No. 12) para. 2.2.36 (1988) (meeting between Mr. De
Clercq and Mr. Sychov in Ghent, Dec. 16, 1987, to discuss draft agreement).
10 Joint Declaration on the establishment of official relations between the European
Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, June 25, 1988, 31
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 157) 35 (1988); discussed in 21 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) para.
1.5.1 (1988); 27 I.L.M. 1418 (1988) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]; see infra Appendix for
complete text of the Declaration. The Declaration was initialled by the negotiators in Mos-
cow on Jan. 9, 1988. It was then signed in Luxembourg on behalf of the EEC by the
President of the Council, Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and by Mr. Willy De Clercq, Member of the Commission, and
for the CMEA by the Chairman of the CMEA's Executive Committee, Mr. Rudolf Rohlicek,
Deputy Prime Minister of Czeckoslovakia, and by Mr. Sychov. 21 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No.
6) para. 1.5.1 (1988).
I1 This quote came from an anonymous CMEA source. [EDs. NOTE: Citing confiden-
tiality concerns of CMEA spokespersons, the author did not attribute this quote to a
named source.] See infra text accompanying notes 110-14.
12 19 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) para. 2.2.39 (1986).
13 21 id. (No. 12) para. 2.2.37 (1988). The European Parliament passed a resolution
to begin negotiations at the June Part Session in Strasbourg, June 9-13, 1986. 19 id. (No.
6) paras. 2.2.42 & 2.4.9 (1986). The EC Council authorized negotiations on Nov. 24,
1986. 19 id. (No. 11) para. 2.2.24 (1987). Further Council directives were given for nego-
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granted to the Commission to negotiate a trade, and cooperation
agreement with Hungary and on September 26, 1988, such an agree-
ment was signed.' 4  Negotiations with Romania on a trade and
economic cooperation agreement to replace the two existing agree-
ments signed in 1980 have been blocked for the moment. This is
because Romania has asked for concessions from the EC which pre-
suppose amendments to the existing authorization-amendments
which the Council is not prepared to issue in view of the present
domestic situation in Romania. 15 Following exploratory talks with
Poland and Bulgaria the EC Council authorized the Commission to
open formal negotiations with these two countries on trade and co-
operation agreements. 16 The negotiations with Poland were re-
cently finalized and the agreement was expected to be initialled in
August of 1989. The agreement with Bulgaria will still take some
rounds of negotiation to complete. In addition, the EC Commission
is in the process of preparing a proposal to the EC Council for open-
ing formal negotiations on a pure trade agreement with the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Commission was recently au-
tiations on a trade, commercial, and economic agreement with Hungary. 20 id. (No. 4)
para. 2.2.28 (1987). This agreement is a straightforward trade agreement based solely on
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. See infra notes 49, 65-69.
14 21 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 11) para. 2.2.29 (1988). On Feb. 11, 1987, the Hun-
garian Deputy Prime Minister visited the European Community to begin preliminary nego-
tiations. 20 id. (No. 2) para. 2.2.20 (1987). Formal negotiations opened in Brussels on
June 4, 1987. 20 id. (No. 6) para. 2.2.29 (1987). The Treaty was initialled on June 30,
1988, and signed in Brussels on Sept. 26, 1988. 21 id. (No. 11) para. 2.2.29 (1988).
The agreement, based on Articles 113 and 235 of the EEC Treaty, may be character-
ized as follows: The agreement consists of two parts, one dealing with trade matters and
the other with cooperation. It is of a nonpreferential nature and covers farm and indus-
trial products except for steel and textiles, which are already regulated in bilateral agree-
ments. The most-favored-nation clause applies to both sides. On the EEC side,
quantitative restrictions will be abolished in three stages ending in 1995. Hungary will
improve access to the Hungarian market, in particular by means of nondiscrimination (for
example, improving its import license system, overall quotas for consumer goods, and
treatment of Community companies). Legal protection of intellectual property will be af-
forded in accordance with international conventions. The possibility of reciprocal conces-
sions on agricultural products is also envisaged. Barter trade will not be promoted.
Finally, there is a safeguard clause should detrimental effects occur in the market of one
party as a result of imports from the other. The cooperation provision of the agreement is
intended to promote economic cooperation in different sectors such as agriculture, en-
ergy, transportation, scientific research, tourism, and the environment. The parties will
exchange economic and trade information and improve the opportunities for investments.
The agreement is thought to be the most ambitious of the agreements in the first round of
discussions with the Eastern European countries. See 21 id. (No. 6) para. 2.2.43 (1988).
The agreement will be administered by a Joint Committee which will meet once each
year. The agreement is valid for ten years and will be extended if neither of the parties
denounces the agreement before its expiration. Id.
It should be borne in mind that neither the agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary nor those under way with the other Eastern European countries will create any free
trade areas between the EEC and those countries since such areas presuppose the same
kind of economic systems, that is, market economies.
15 See 21 id. (No. 11) para. 2.2.28 (1988).
16 The EC Council gave the Commission such authorization on Feb. 20, 1989.
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thorized to begin formal negotiations with the Soviet Union on a
trade and cooperation agreement.' 7
By September 1988 all CMEA countries except Romania and
Mongolia had lodged applications for the establishment of diplo-
matic relations with the EC. 18 Of these, the EC has, so far, approved
those applications of the Eastern European countries and Cuba. 19
The Soviet Union's change in attitude, including its willingness
to establish diplomatic relations with the EC, is explained by the for-
eign policy that country has pursued since Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev
came to power in 1985. As a means of restructuring the declining
Soviet economy, the extension of trade and cooperation relations is
vital. In this context, the increasing importance of Brussels, seat of
the EEC, as a political power center cannot be ignored. From the
Soviet point of view, the Declaration by the EEC and the CMEA will
give the latter increased political importance and perhaps will also
further cooperation within it.
These recent developments in East-West relations are all en-
compassed by the measures envisaged by the Second Basket of the
Final Act of Helsinki 1975.20 This Article mainly concerns the legal
nature of the joint Declaration and the obligations arising from it.21
Political and economic aspects are not discussed in detail. 22
II. Legally Binding and Nonlegally Binding Agreements 23
The very use of the term "Declaration" to denominate the
17 The EC Council authorized the commencement of negotiations with the USSR on
June 12, 1989.
18 27 I.L.M. 1418 (1988).
19 This information came to the author through confidential diplomatic channels.
20 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, re-
printed in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter CSCE or Final Act of Helsinki].
21 See also Lys6n, EEC-CMEA/Eastern Europe, Legal Aspects on Trade and Cooperation, 2
LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 83 (1987); Maslen, The European Community's Relations
with the State-Trading Countries 1981-1983 (Annual Survey), 1983 Y.B. EURO. L. 323 [hereinaf-
ter Maslen I]; Maslen, The European Community's Relations with the State-Trading Countries of
Europe 1984-1986 (Annual Survey), 1986 Y.B. EURO. L. 335 [hereinafter Maslen II; Maslen,
A Turning Point: Past and Future of the European Community 's Relations with Eastern Europe,
RIVISTA DI STUDI POLITICI INTERNAZIONALI 557 (1988) [hereinafter Maslen III]; Schneider,
Einige Aspekte der Zuktinftigen Beziehugen der Europdische Gemeinschaft mit Osteuropa, in PERSPEK-
TIVEN FUR SICHERHEIT UND ZUSAMMENARBEIT IN EUROPA (H.D. Jacobsen, H. Machowski, D.
Sager eds. 1988).
22 On those aspects see generally, Maslen 1, supra note 21; Maslen II, supra note 21;
Maslen Ill, supra note 21; Schneider, supra note 21.
23 See generally Bothe, Legal and Non-legal Norms-A Meaningful Distinction in International
Relations?, 1980 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 65; I. DETTER DE Lupis, THE CONCEPT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); Minch, Non-binding Agreements, 1969 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1; Schacter, The Twilight Existence of
Non-binding International Agreements, 71 AM.J. INT'L L. 296 (1977); I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1984); G. TUNKIN, LAW AND FORCE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1985); Virally, La Distinction Entre Textes Internationaux Ayant Une
PortieJuridique Dans Les Relations Mutuelles Entre Leurs Auteurs Et Textes Qui En Sont Dipourvus,
Rapport Definitif, 60 INSTITUT DE DROIT INT'L 328 (1983).
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agreement raises the question of whether the document is legally
binding, since states often use names such as "Act," "Declaration,"
"Understanding," or "Resolution" for documents in which they ex-
press their concerted political or moral views or intentions. The best
known document of this type is the Final Act of Helsinki24 where the
parties signing it evidently did not intend to create a treaty in the
sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Con-
vention).25 In other words, the Act does not create legal relations
between the parties signing it in accordance with public international
law. Another example is the Final Document of the Stockholm Con-
ference 1986.26 Paragraph 101 explicitly states that "[t]he measures
adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into
force on 1 January 1987."27 Accordingly, the legal status of the Dec-
laration merits some discussion.
The distinction made by states between legally binding and
nonlegally binding instruments can best be understood in the con-
text of some general assumptions about international law. The sys-
tem of international law is designed to define the legal relations
between states which are the subjects and addressees of that law. In
addition, other entities such as international organizations created
by states may be subjects of international law. Although individual
persons (legal and physical) in certain instances may derive and
claim rights from international law, such persons are not subjects in
international law but, rather, objects. 28
24 See generally Bothe, supra note 23. See also Schweisfurth, Zur Frage der Rechisnatur,
Verbindlichkeit und V67kerrechtlichen Relevanz der KSZE-Schlussakte, 1976 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUS-
LANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 681.
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27, 63 A.J.I.L. 875, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vi-
enna Convention entered into force on Jan. 2, 1980, see id., art. 84, and has no retroactive
effects, meaning it only applies to treaties concluded by states subsequent to its entry into
force. Id., art. 4. Thus, customary law on treaties is applicable to treaties concluded prior
to that date.
Now that the Vienna Convention is in force, there are two overlapping regimes appli-
cable to treaties that come within the ambit of the Convention. The Convention applies
between parties having ratified or acceded to the Convention and customary law of treaties
applies to all other contractual relations between states unless otherwise provided by the
parties to a treaty. For more information on the Vienna Convention, see 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIOAL LAW 459 (1984).
26 Final Document of the Stockholm Conference 1986, Sept. 19, 1986, 86 DEP'T ST.
BULL. No. 2116, at 20, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 190 (1987) [hereinafter Final Document of the
Stockholm Conference].
27 Id., para. 101 (emphasis added). A final example of such an instrument is the Sol-
emn Declaration on European Union signed by the Heads of State or Governments of the
EC Member States in Stuttgart on June 19, 1983. See 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) para.
1.6.1 (1983). It should be noted that a politically binding document may be drafted in
such a way as to appear similar to a treaty, as for example the Final Document of the
Stockholm Conference, supra note 26, and may also have the same effectiveness as a treaty.
In theory one may construe an international instrument such that it is composed partly of
legally binding clauses and partly of clauses not having that character.
28 See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-66 (1979).
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States, considered to be equal and sovereign in their rights, are
able to enter into oral and written agreements with each other.
These agreements may be considered either legal instruments, mak-
ing them the prime source of international law,2 9 or "merely" polit-
ical, moral documents. A secondary source of international law is
created by state practice (usage), accepted by states as expressing
principles or rules of law according to opiniojuris sive necessitatis, that
is, customary law.30
The creation of rules of international law depends on the ex-
press or tacit consent of states. 31 It also follows that there is nor-
mally no legislator "above" states and a state is to a very great extent
its own "legislator." '32 Legally binding agreements between states
are rather to be viewed as contracts regardless of whether agree-
ments for other purposes may be characterized as "contracts" or
"law-making treaties." 33
Consequently, states may choose to enter into agreements that
are legal instruments or political documents. In the former case an
instrument has legally binding force under international law while in
the latter case it is devoid of such a force; it carries only moral
weight. Nevertheless, through the consent of states, moral rules may
become rules of international law whereby the rules acquire a vigor
which they did not possess before. 34 The difference between these
two types of rules is not only one of hierarchy but also of quality and
nature. Thus, international law sets the ultimate parameters of be-
havior between states.
For the purposes of the Vienna Convention, a "treaty" is de-
fined as "an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and
whatever its particular designation."3 5 Thus, the Vienna Convention
is only applicable to written international agreements provided that
the signatory states intended to submit their agreement to interna-
tional law (auctor regit actum).
The Convention is not applicable to oral agreements between
29 Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1 (a), 59
Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, reprinted in CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 129
(Millar ed. 1984).
30 Id., art. 38, para. 1 (b).
31 Lotus Case (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18; Asylum Case (Colom.
v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266; Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131.
32 The importance of legally binding decisions by international organizations on their
member states is not considered in this Article, nor the impact of nonlegally binding deci-
sions of such organizations upon the creation of rules of international law.
33 For a discussion of the classification of treaties, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at
630-31.
34 See id. at 14.
35 Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 2, para. 1 (a).
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states even if governed by international law3 6 nor to agreements be-
tween states governed by national law.3 7 In addition, the Conven-
tion does not apply to agreements between states and international
organizations 38 nor to agreements between such organizations them-
selves. 39 Consequently, the Convention is not applicable to the Joint
Declaration even if the parties intended for the Declaration to be
governed by international law. Nevertheless, the Declaration itself
does not specify any particular law that should apply to it.
Consequently, one may ask: what law, if any, is applicable to the
Declaration? Interestingly, the Vienna Convention itself may play a
role in this determination. The Convention's seeming inapplicability
to the Joint Declaration should not alter either the legal effects of the
Declaration or the application of some of the rules set forth in the
Convention to which the Declaration "would be subject under inter-
national law independently of the Convention."'40 This is so because
the Declaration would be governed by the customary law on treaties
with regard to international organizations as that law existed when
the Vienna Convention entered into force, and by any further devel-
opments since that time which may have been caused, inter alia, by
the very rules of the Convention. 4'
Nevertheless, the question still remains whether the Declaration
is legally binding. In assessing the nature of an international agree-
ment (regardless of its designation), the crucial question is whether
the Parties intended to create a legally binding document, provided
they possessed treaty-making powers at all. Because there are no
simple criteria by which to determine this, each document must be
examined individually. In so doing, the following considerations, in-
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id., art. 1.
39 Id.
40 Id., art. 3(b). The same applies to agreements between states and other subjects of
international law or to oral agreements between states. Furthermore, though the Vienna
Convention does not apply to nonsignatory subjects of international law, the Convention
still applies in multilateral agreements among those states that have ratified or acceeded to
the Convention. Id., art. 3(c).
41 An example is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, re-
printed in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Vienna Convention]. The 1986 Vienna
Convention was adopted by 67 states, with 1 against (France) and 23 abstentions. Confer-
ence on the Law of Treaties Adopts New Vienna Convention, U.N. CHRONICLE, Apr. 1986, at 97.
However, the treaty has not yet entered into force and, with this demonstrated lack of
consensus, probably never will.
The first 80 Articles correspond closely to the first 80 of the Vienna Convention. See
generally Manin, La Convention de Vienne Sur Le Droit Des Traitis Entre Etats Et Organisations
Internationales Ou Entre Organisations Internationales, 1986 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIs DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL 455; do Nascimento e Silva, The 1986 Vienna Convention and the Treaty-Making
Power of International Organizations, 1986 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 68; Pernice, VOlkerrechtliche
Vertrage Internationaler Organisationen, 1988 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 229.
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ter alia, must be taken into account: (1) Does the content of the
agreement lend itself to legal regulation? (2) Does the language
evoke any intent to let the instrument be governed by law? (3) Have
the Parties acted (before and after concluding the agreement) in
such a way as to indicate an intention to create a legally binding
instrument?
It is important to understand why a distinction must be made
between legally binding and nonlegally binding international agree-
ments, that is, between moral norms of a legal character and other
moral norms. There are different ways in which a party can be
bound to an agreement, but legal agreements are the supreme form
of binding because of the consequences of violation under interna-
tional law. This is what distinguishes legal forms of agreement from
other forms of restriction expressed in various declarations of intent.
This is evidenced by states' common desire in certain cases not to be
legally bound but rather to use a form which is less exigent and al-
lows more freedom or flexibility. In such cases, the instrument may
be called an Act, Declaration, Resolution, or Understanding. The
political obligations may entail legal effects, for example, the applica-
tion of the principle of estoppel. 42
It is important, however, to make a clear demarcation between
legal obligations embodied in agreements and those which flow from
political commitments. Without this, uncertainty arises as to the law
to be applied with the result that the force and efficiency of interna-
tional law decreases. In any particular case it may be difficult to as-
certain exactly what the legal obligations are under the agreement
because of inexact formulation or discretionary reservations. In such
cases the law must be recognized as acting with equal force on all the
obligations to which the parties subscribed regardless of how pre-
cisely the agreement's obligations are drafted. The notion of "soft
law" must be rejected on the grounds that it is both detrimental to
the system of international law and is theoretically inappropriate be-
cause, among other reasons, one legal rule cannot be more legal
than another. For the purposes of developing orderly relations
within the international community, it is important for states to be
able to employ different instruments on different occasions as they
see fit.
A good illustration is the Final Act of Helsinki. 43 This agreement
initiated the CSCE process 44 and contributed to a significant relaxa-
42 Estoppel appears to be a general principle of international law, founded on good
faith and consistency, but "shorn" of the technical features associated with private, domes-
tic law. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 638.
43 See supra note 20.
44 Cf Joint Declaration, supra note 10, preamble.
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tion of tensions in Europe.4 5 But the Act never could have become a
treaty because of the political climate.4 6 Thus, there will always be
situations in which it is "useful to formulate shared expectations, be
they only of a lower degree of certainty." 4 7
III. Treaty-Making Powers of the EEC and the CMEA
Significant clues as to the legal character of the Declaration can
be derived from the examination of the treaty-making powers of the
EEC and the CMEA. 4 8
A. EEC Powers
Article 210 of the EEC Treaty provides that "[t]he Community
shall have legal personality. ' 49 In the ERTA judgment 50 the Euro-
pean Court referred to this Article, saying:
This provision, placed at the head of Part Six of the Treaty, de-
voted to "General and Final Provisions," means that in its external
relations the Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual
links with third countries over the whole field of objectives defined
in Part One of the Treaty, which Part Six supplements.
Such authority (i.e., to enter into international agreements)
arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty-as is the
case with Articles 113 and 114 for tariff and trade agreements and
with Article 238 association agreements-but may equally flow from
other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within
the framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions.
5 1
From the ERTA case it follows that the implied external powers
45 See, e.g., Lodgaard, The Building of Confidence and Security at the Negotiations in Stockholm
and Vienna, 1986 STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RES. INST. Y.B. 423.
46 See Bothe, supra note 23, at 91.
47 id.
48 Note that the matter of treaty-making powers of international organizations is
treated by the 1986 Vienna Convention. "The capacity of an international organization to
conclude treaties is governed by the rules of that organization." 1986 Vienna Convention,
supra note 41, art. 6. A treaty is defined as "an international agreement governed by inter-
national law and concluded in written form . . . whatever its particular designation." Id.,
art. 2, para. 1 (a).
For a discussion of EEC powers, see J.V. Louis & P. BRUCKNER, LE DROIT DE LA
COMMUNAUTi ECONOMIQUE EUROPkENNE, RELATIONS EXTIERIEURS (1980); J.V. Louis,
L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE (1983); J. GROUX & P. MANIN, THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1984). For a discussion of CMEA powers, see G.
SCHIAVONE, THE INSTITUTIONS OF COMECON (1981); De Fiumel, The Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance in International Relations, STUD. INT'L REL. 60 (1976); De Fiumel, Aspects
Juridiques Des Relations Officielles Entre Le CAEM Et La CEE, 1980 POLISH Y.B. INT'L LAw 67;
Rajski, Les Relations Exterieures Du Conseil D'Aide Economique Mutuelle, 1978 CLUNET 534;
Schweisfurth, The Treaty-Making Capacity of the CMEA in Light of a Framework Agreement Be-
tween the EEC and the CMEA, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 615 (1985) [hereinafter Schweis-
furth III.
49 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 210,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty or Treaty of Rome].
50 Commission v. Council, 1971 .E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263 [hereinafter ERTA].
51 Id. at 274.
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of the EEC run parallel to its internal powers. The Community has
exclusive power to govern in certain areas defined by EEC Treaty
provisions, for example, commercial policy. 5 2 The EEC also
preempts national government where the Community has laid down
binding common rules, regardless of the means-internal legislation
or conclusion of agreements. 53 The power of the Community may
be extended via Article 235 under which such power may be used to
issue internal acts or to conclude international agreements. 54 Until
the Community has exercised its powers under the Treaty, Member
States have parallel power in such matters. It must be emphasized
that the Member States have transferred, once and for all, national
powers to the Community in accordance with the Treaty-powers
which are to be exercised by the Community. 55
To the above-mentioned explicit powers should be added those
mentioned in Articles 131 through 136 concerning the association of
overseas countries and territories with the Community56 and those
of the Commission in order to maintain contacts with international
organizations. 5
7
B. EEC Procedures
Article 228(1) states in general terms that the Commission shall
negotiate and the Council shall conclude agreements on behalf of
the EEC with "one or more States or an international organisa-
tion," 5 8 save for the power vested in the Commission to conclude
certain agreements such as those defined by Articles 229 through
231. 5 9
If an agreement is beyond the power of the Commission to con-
clude, Article 228 applies. 60 From the ERTA doctrine it follows that
Article 228 applies not only to agreements based on explicit treaty-
making powers but also to agreements based on powers derived
52 See, e.g., Bulk Oil v. Sun Int'l Ltd. and Sun Oil Trading Co., 1986 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 559. "[S]ince full responsibility in the matter of commercial policy was transferred to
the Community by Article 113(1) measures of commercial policy of a national character
are only permissible after the end of the transitional period by virtue of specific authoriza-
tion by the Community." Id. at 586.
53 See Opinion 1/75, 1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1355, 1363-64 [hereinafter Opinion
1/75].
54 See EEC Treaty, supra note 49, art. 235.
55 N.V. Algemene Transport En Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend En Loos v.
Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1; Da Costa v. Ente Nazionale
Energia Elettrica, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585.
56 EEC Treaty, supra note 49, arts. 131-36 & 238.
57 Id., arts. 229-31.
58 Id., art. 228, para. 1.
59 This includes agreements with the organs of the United Nations, the UN's special-
ized agencies, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Council of Europe, the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, and all other international organiza-
tions. Id., arts. 229-31.
60 Id., art. 228, para. I.
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from other Articles of the Treaty whereby such Article(s) must be
combined with Article 228.
Article 228 seems to say that it is applicable only to legally bind-
ing agreements entered into with other subjects of international law,
regardless of the designation of the agreement. 6' First, the Article
refers to the treaty-making powers "[w]here this Treaty provides for
the conclusion . "..."62 Second, the institutions and the Member
States may obtain the European Court's opinion on the compatibility
of a contemplated agreement with the EEC Treaty. 63 Third, agree-
ments so concluded are binding not only on the EEC but also on its
Member States. 64
Article 228 only provides a general framework for negotiating
and concluding agreements and it has been left to the institutions to
fill in detailed rules in conformity with international law and the EEC
Treaty. This has been done through the day-to-day work of the
Commission and Council, and by the decisions of the European
Court. Nevertheless, the scheme set out in Articles 111 through 114
furnishes a generally applicable model for negotiating and conclud-
ing agreements. 65
After appropriate contacts have been made, this procedure pro-
vides that the Commission pursue informal exploratory discussions
to determine the demands of the opposing country or organization
and recommend to the Council whether formal negotiations should
be opened. 66 The opening of negotiations follows upon the grant of
authorization by the Council.67 The authorization is generally ac-
companied by directives for the negotiations and very often requires
the Commission to consult a special committee composed of repre-
sentatives from the Member States. 68 The Commission then informs
the Council on developments in the negotiations. Note that the
Council may refuse to accept the result of the Commission's negotia-
61 According to the court any legally binding agreement is envisaged by Article
228(l)-(2):
The formal designation of the agreement envisaged under international
law is not of decisive importance in connexion with the admissibility of the
request. In its reference to an "agreement," the second subparagraph of
Article 228(l) of the Treaty uses the expression in a general sense to indicate
any undertaking entered into by entities subject to international law which
has binding force, whatever its formal designation.
Opinion 1/75, supra note 53, at 1361. It is difficult to conceive that the first section would
comprise something that the second would not, that is, nonlegally binding agreements.
62 EEC Treaty, supra note 49, art. 228, para. 1.
63 Id.
64 Id., art. 228, para. 2.
65 The specific problems and procedures connected with "mixed agreements" are
not considered in this Piece. See generally D. O'KEEFE & H. SCHERMERS, MIXED AGREE-
MENTS (1983).
66 EEC Treaty, supra note 49, art. 113, paras. 2 & 3.
67 Id., art. 113, para. 3.
68 See id.
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tions.69 Negotiations are often closed by the initialling of a written
Agreement by the Parties.
The agreement may be concluded using one of two methods:
the simple procedure or the solemn procedure. For the simple pro-
cedure there first must be consultation of the Parliament when re-
quired by the Treaty. Whether the Parliament or other community
organs must be consulted depends on which article(s) of the EEC
Treaty the agreement is based. Second, the Council approves the
agreement in a sui generis decision and authorizes its President to
designate a person to sign the agreement on behalf of the EEC, that
is, to express consent to be bound as a matter of law. The signing of
the agreement is often done by both the Council and the Commis-
sion. The agreement will come into force immediately or as other-
wise provided. 70
For the solemn procedure, the Council decides, sui generis, to
sign the agreement. The Council then authorizes its President or a
designate to sign on condition of the Council's later approval to be
bound. The Parliament must then be consulted if required by the
Treaty. Finally, the Council approves the agreement and authorizes
its President to ratify the agreement. Upon approval, there may be
deposition of instruments of ratification and the agreement comes
into force as provided in the agreement or otherwise. 7 '
For the Joint Declaration, the EEC institutions have followed the
simple procedure and the conclusion of the Declaration has been
based on Articles 228 and 235.72
Once the procedures in the EEC Treaty for entering into a le-
gally binding agreement have been satisfied, the Community's intent
is evident. The fact that Article 228 envisages only legally binding
instruments does not exclude the EEC from entering into nonlegally
binding agreements within its competency, and in such cases Article
228 does not apply.7 3
69 See id., art. 113, para. 4.
70 See 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
243-44 (1989).
71 See 3 id. at 695-97 (1988).
72 On June 16, 1988, the Parliament adopted the Commission's proposal to the
Council to conclude the Joint Declaration. See 1988-89 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 333) 1
(1988) (Explanatory Memorandum). The Parliament was consulted by the Council in ac-
cordance with Article 235. The Council decided to sign the Joint Declaration on June 22,
1988. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No: L 157) 34 (1988).
73 In support of this view, see Opinion 1/75, supra note 53.
In [Opinion 1/75] the Court stressed that what counts with regard to the
application of the Treaty is the question whether negotiations undertaken
within the framework of an international organization are intended to lead to
an "undertaking entered into by entities subject to international law which
has binding force." In such a case it is the provisions of the Treaty relating
to the negotiation and conclusion of agreeements, in other words Articles
113, 114 and 228, which apply and not Article 116.
Opinion 1/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2915, 2916. Note, for example, that the Final
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C. CMEA Powers
The legal capacity of the CMEA is defined by Article XIII(I) and
(3) of the Charter of the CMEA 74 and in the Convention on the
Legal Capacity, Privileges, and Immunities of the CMEA. 75 Although
doubts about the existence of the legal personality of the CMEA may
have existed at one time, these doubts have been removed. 76
Article III(l) of the CMEA Charter states that the CMEA may
"assist the member countries of the Council in the preparation and
execution ofjoint measures."' 77 Article X, entitled "Participation of
Other Countries in the Work of the Council," envisages cooperation
with third countries, permitting participation in the work of the or-
gans of the Council or otherwise. 78 In either case, the conditions
shall be set forth "by the Council in agreement with the countries
concerned." '79 Article XI specifically provides that the Cbuncil may
establish relations with international organizations where "[t]he na-
ture and form of such relations shall be determined by the Council in
agreement with the international organizations concerned."8 0 It
should be noted that the Russian word for "agreement" used by the
Charter implies an agreement governed by international law.8 1
The CMEA is a classical international organization in that no
real powers have been transferred to the CMEA from the Member
States. Article III, entitled "Functions and Powers," enumerates ac-
tivities which the Member States (all or some of them according to
Act of Helsinki was signed by Mr. Aldo Moro in his capacity as the Prime Minister of the
Italian Republic and as the President in office of the Council of the EC.
74 Charter of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Dec. 14, 1959, art. XIII,
paras. I & 3, 368 U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter CMEA Charter], reprinted in W.E. BUTLER, A
SOURCE BOOK OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 125 (1978). Article XIII(1)
reads: "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance shall enjoy, on the territories of all
member countries of the Council, the legal capacity essential to the performance of its
functions and the achievements of its purposes." Id., art. XIII, para. 1.
75 Convention Concerning the Juridical Personality, Privileges and Immunities of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Dec. 14, 1959, 368 U.N.T.S. 237. See also Con-
vention on the Juridical Personality, Privileges and Immunities of the CMEA, June 27,
1986, - U.N.T.S. -.
76 Schweisfurth II, supra note 48, at 617-19.
77 CMEA Charter, supra note 74, art. III, para. 1.
78 Id., art. X. Agreements between the CMEA and third countries include the follow-
ing: Administration Agreement, Sept. 17, 1964, CMEA-Yugoslavia, 1968 Yugo. M.U. 117;
Cooperation Agreement, May 16, 1973, CMEA-Finland, 894 U.N.T.S. 59 (English text in
W.E. BUTLER, supra note 74, at 270); Cooperation Agreement, 1975, CMEA-Iraq, -
U.N.T.S. -; Science and Technology Agreement, Aug. 13, 1975, CMEA-Mexico, - Mex.
T.B. 27; Cooperation Agreement with Nicaragua, 1983, CMEA-Nicaragua, - U.N.T.S. -;
Cooperation Agreement with Mozambique, 1985, CMEA-Mozambique, - U.N.T.S. -.
See generally Schweisfurth II, supra note 48, at 626.
79 CMEA Charter, supra note 74, art. X.
80 Id., art. XI. The CMEA maintains relations, inter alia, with various agencies of the
United Nations and also concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in 1975. Agreement with International Atomic Energy Agency, Sept. 26, 1975,
CMEA-IAEA, 1022 U.N.T.S.-.
81 Schweisfurth II, supra note 48, at 627.
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the principle of interest)8 2 may agree to carry out within the frame-
work of the organization.83 Nevertheless, the external powers of the
CMEA are determined, within the broad parameters set by the Char-
ter, on a case-by-case basis and only extend as far as all members
agree. Note that the CMEA does not pursue a foreign commercial
policy of its own.
D. CMEA Procedures
Each step in the CMEA's negotiation of international agree-
ments must be unanimously approved by the Member States. 84
This, of course, can be quite an obstacle. Two procedures are used
to negotiate agreements.
Under the first method, only the approval by the Session 85 or
the Executive Committee8 6 is needed, whereupon the consent to be
bound as a matter of law is expressed by signature, exchange of let-
ters, or by documents of approval.
Under the second method, the agreement is first approved by all
the Member States and, following internal approval of the CMEA, it
is ratified by the signing parties.8 7
For the Joint Declaration, the negotiations with the EEC were
pursued by representatives of the CMEA's Secretariat in consultation
with Member States. The Declaration was approved by all the Mem-
ber States, unanimously adopted by the Executive Committee of the
CMEA, and subsequently signed in Luxembourg. 88
It appears that the CMEA normally regulates its relations with
third countries and international organizations through legally bind-
ing international agreements although it may also employ nonlegally
binding instruments. Mr. Sychov, Secretary of the CMEA, suggested
in his letter ofJune 1985 to Mr. Delors, President of the EC Commis-
sion, that official relations should be established by adopting a pre-
sumably nonlegally binding agreement, a proposal that would have
pleased the EC Commission. 9 However, on the suggestion of the
82 CMEA Charter, supra note 74, art. IV, para. 3.
83 See id., art. I, para. 2 & art. 1lI.
84 Schweisfurth II, supra note 48, at 635. "All decisions integral to the treaty-making
process, i.e., the initial decision to establish treaty relations, instructions to the negotiators,
the presentation of a draft agreement and inter-organizational consent to an agreement
negotiated must be taken unanimously. Lack of unanimity is an obstacle to each step in
the treaty-making process." Id.
85 The Assembly is the supreme organ of the CMEA. CMEA Charter, supra note 74,
art. VI, para. 1.
86 The Executive Committee is composed of one representative from each of the
Member States "at the level of deputy heads of government." Id., art. VII (as translated in
W.E. BUTLER, supra note 74, at 270).
87 This method was used for the cooperation agreement between the CMEA and Fin-
land. Cooperation Agreement with Finland, supra note 74, art. 8.
88 See supra text accompanying note 10.
89 See 18 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) paras. 2.3.37-.38 (1985).
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CMEA, the document was "upgraded" to come within the applica-
tion of Article 228 of the EEC Treaty,90 although the original
designation of the instrument remained unchanged. Thus, the in-
tention of the CMEA to conclude a legally binding agreement is
evident.
IV. Material Content of the Declaration
A. Establishment of Official Relations
Clause 1 of the Joint Declaration states that the EEC and the
CMEA are establishing official relations through this document. 9'
The specific meaning of "official relations" is not clear, but the ex-
pression implies that the prevailing state of relations is "unofficial,"
that is informal. This is further borne out by the various informal
contacts between the two organizations since 1974.92 Therefore,
one may conclude that official relations include, in part, the de jure
recognition of the EEC as a subject of international law, and the ac-
ceptance of the EEC's independence and its own powers as trans-
ferred to it by its Member States. 93 The wording of the Preamble of
the Declaration supports the last contention by stating: "HAVING
REGARD to the acts establishing the EEC and the CMEA, and in
particular the Treaty of Rome [the EEC Treaty]," in conjunction
with the expression "by the activities they pursue within their fields
of competence .... .,94 All these implications following from the
establishment of offical relations apply mutatis mutandis to the CMEA.
B. Cooperation
In Clause 2 the development of cooperation is envisaged in ar-
eas where both Parties are competent and there is a common interest
to do so.95 This does not include foreign commercial policy meas-
ures because they are outside the competence of the CMEA and rest
with its Member States.
According to Clause 3, the area, forms, and methods of coopera-
90 See 21 id. (No. 6) para. 1.5.2 (1988).
9 Joint Declaration, supra note 10, clause 1.
92 E.g., supra notes 8-9.
93 Recognition in international law of "States or governments or other designators of
recognition" may be done to "establish official or non-official, full or partial, permanent or
temporary relations with them." A DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (M. Saifulin
ed. 1986). Dejure recognition customarily
takes place when the recognising State has no doubt as to the legality of the
newly emerged State or government to be recognised, or, compelled by cir-
cumstances, has to accept it as an irreversiblefai accompli and deems it neces-
sary to establish normal diplomatic relations and cooperation with the
recognised State. [Dejure recognition] is usually considered full and final.
Id. A unilateral declaration is normally used to recognize a State or government, but an
agreement with the new State or government may also be used.
94 Joint Declaration, supra note 10, preamble.
,95 ld., cl. 2.
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tion are to be determined by the parties as agreed upon by their rep-
resentatives designated for these purposes. 96 The wording of this
Clause, in conjunction with Clause 4's view toward future coopera-
tion, seems to imply a step-by-step procedure for developing cooper-
ation in certain areas. An earlier version of Clause 3 included some
defined fields of cooperation, explaining Clause 4's wording to a cer-
tain extent. The cooperation may entail identification of problems of
a general nature within the relations between the EEC and Eastern
Europe which could be solved either on a bilateral basis, or multilat-
erally such as within the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE). Such a development presupposes that the Parties are able to
create an efficient system for exchanging information and channels
for consultations.
One possible forum for the representatives mentioned in Clause
3 is an ad hoc working group that might become permanent or the
creation of a mixed committee.
C. Territorial Application of the Declaration
The Vienna Convention only states that an agreement applies to
the entire territory of the states concerned unless otherwise pro-
vided.97 Since the Convention only applies to treaties between
states, 98 there are no rules concerning the territorial application of
treaties concluded between states and international organizations.99
Such rules may be found in the provisions of the founding treaty of
an organization or by provisions in other agreements concluded by
an organization.
In Article 227 of the EEC Treaty, provisions were laid down
about the territorial application of the Treaty. ' 00 The Treaty applies
to the European territories of the Member States with certain excep-
tions' 0 ' and in some cases on certain conditions.' 0 2 Application of
96 Id., cl. 3. A first meeting between the parties was held in November 1988 where
the delegations mainly discussed forms and methods of cooperation and the respective
activities and powers of the EC and the CMEA.
97 Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 29.
98 Id., art. 1.
99 The 1986 Vienna Convention did not improve matters. "Unless a different inten-
tion appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty between one or more
States or one or more international organizations is binding upon each State party in re-
spect of its entire territory." 1986 Vienna Convention, supra note 41, art. 29.
10 EEC Treaty, supra note 49, art. 227.
101 The EEC Treaty does not apply to the Faeroe Islands. Id., art. 227, para. 5(a), as
amended by Act of Accession, Mar. 27, 1972, art. 26, para. 3, 15J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 73)
1 (1972), modified by Decision of Adaptation, Jan. i, 1973, art. 15, para. 2, 16 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 2) 2 (1973). In addition, following an agreement between the Member
States regulating future relations between Greenland and the EEC, signed Mar. 13, 1984,
and ratified by all Member States, the EEC Treaty ceased to apply to Greenland as of Feb.
i, 1985. 18 EUR. COMM. BULL. (No. 2) para. 1.4.1 (1985).
102 Examples include the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. EEC Treaty, supra note
49, art. 227, para. 5(c), as amended by Act of Accession, Mar. 27, 1972, 15J.O. COMM. EUR.
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the Treaty to territories outside Europe and in West Berlin is very
complicated. '0 3
When an agreement is concluded by the EEC, the Community
normally includes a clause about the agreement's application to vari-
ous territories. An example is a clause used in the first Lom6 Con-
vention:' 0 4 "This Convention shall apply to the European territories
to which the [EEC Treaty] applies, in accordance with the conditions
set out in that Treaty, on the one hand, and to the territories of the
[African, Caribbean, and Pacific] States on the other."' 10 5
A special problem is the Treaty's application to the Western
Sectors of Berlin.' 0 6 The legal status of Berlin is a complex and deli-
cate matter. The Western Sectors do not form part of the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and are not governed by that State, a
position which was not changed by the Quadripartite Agreement. 0 7
Following the signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union ceased
to oppose the extension of laws, regulations, and international
agreements of the FRG to West Berlin. With regard to international
agreements concluded by the FRG, Annex IV(B) of the Quadripar-
tite Agreement permits the extension of such an agreement to West
Berlin provided that the intention is stipulated in the agreement or is
so declared by the FRG and that the agreement does not affect the
status and security of West Berlin.10 8 Accordingly, the Soviet Union
need not accept every treaty concluded by the FRG which the latter
wants to extend to West Berlin, and, in fact, the Soviet Union still
opposes the application of the EEC Treaty, derived Community law,
and Community international agreements to West Berlin. The So-
viet Union, supported by its Eastern European allies, has always con-
sidered the integration of West Berlin with the EC to be
incompatible with the international legal status of Berlin because of
(No. L 73) 1 (1972), modified by Decision of Adaptation, Jan. 1, 1973, art. 16, 16 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 2) 2 (1973). The Treaty does apply to Gibraltar. Id., art. 227, para. 4, as
amended by Act of Accession, supra, modified by Decision of Adaptation, supra.
103 See id., art. 227, para. 13 & arts. 131-36.
104 The European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
Convention of Lomb, Feb. 28, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 595, 621 (1975).
105 Id., art. 85, para. i.
106 See Hiutte, Berlin and the European Communities, 1983 Y.B. EURO. L. 1; Wengler, Berlin-
Ouest Et Les Communautis Europeennes, 1978 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INT'L 217.
107 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 283, T.I.A.S. No.
7551 [hereinafter Quadripartite Agreement]. It is unclear if the German Democratic Re-
public has acquired sovereignty over East Berlin rather than simple de facto control.
108 Id., Annex IV(B). Note for example the International Cocoa Agreement of 1972
(mixed agreement), in which the Soviet Union made the following declaration: "The So-
viet Union can take note of the declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany concern-
ing the extension of the application of the Agreement in question to [West] Berlin only on
the understanding that such extension is effected in accordance with the Quadripartite
Agreement of 3 September 1971 and provided that the established procedures are fol-
lowed." International Cocoa Agreement, 1972, Oct. 21, 1972, 882 U.N.T.S. 67.
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the final objective of the Community-the formation of a political
unit among its Member States.
Federal legislation and international agreements of the FRG do
not automatically become applicable to West Berlin but remain con-
ditioned upon adoption by the Senate of West Berlin and the censor-
ship which may be exercised by the Allied Kommendatura of Berlin
by virtue of the droit de l'occupation. Despite the Soviet Union's oppo-
sition, the EEC Treaty, derived Community law, and international
agreements concluded by the EEC do apply to West Berlin, since the
three Western Allied Powers have agreed to this, on conditions simi-
lar to those applicable to the federal laws and agreements of the
FRG. 109
When the EEC has concluded a bilateral agreement with an
Eastern European country the insertion of a territorial clause has
been difficult because the wording of the clause normally employed
by the Community also includes the application of the agreement to
West Berlin." 0 Nevertheless, such clauses have been included in a
number of agreements11" ' and at signature the Eastern European
109 For a discussion of the legal basis for this, see Wengler, supra note 106, at 229.
The Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and
Euratom, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, includes ajoint Declaration on Berlin, id. at 10,
in addition to the adoption of the EEC, id. at 11, and Euratom Treaties, id. at 169, and the
Protocol on German Internal Trade and Connected Problems. Id. at 131. The Confer-
ence took note of "A Declaration by the Government of the FRG on the Application of the
Treaties to Berlin," which read: "The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
reserves the right to declare, when depositing its instruments of ratification, that the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the Treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community shall equally apply to Land Berlin." Id. at 10.
Subsequently, an FRG law approving the Treaties also made them applicable to Land
Berlin upon approval of the Senate of Berlin, given by the adoption of a special law to that
end. The same declaration was made by the FRG with respect to the Treaty establishing a
Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, signed Apr. 8,
1965, entered into force July I, 1967, 10J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 152) 18 (1967) (the Merger
Treaty); and the Accession Treaties of 1972, Mar. 27, 1972, 15J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 73)
195 (1972); of 1979, May 28, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 189 (1979); and of
1985, June 12, 1985, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 302) 484 (1985).
Article 227(4) extends the application of the EEC Treaty to "European territories for
whose external relations a Member State is responsible." EEC Treaty, supra note 49, art.
227, para. 4. Since the Parties to the EEC Treaty do not possess the legal rights to dispose
of matters relative to Berlin, the effect of this provision is contingent upon the consent by
the three Western Allied Powers to entrust to the FRG the task to represent West Berlin
externally. Although such a consent has been given, these Powers still remain responsible
for West Berlin in all matters.
110 See 21 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) para. 1.5.3 (1988).
Ill Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania have all en-
tered into arrangements with the EEC covering trade in textiles and sheep or goat meat or
both. Romania has also entered into an agreement on trade in industrial products. See
Maslen I, supra note 21, at 330-32. In the Polish agreement on trade in textile products,
the clause reads as follows: "This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territo-"
ries in which the [EEC Treaty] is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty
and, on the other hand, to the territory of Poland." Council Regulation (EEC) No.
885/82, of Mar. 31, 1982, art. 18, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 107) i, 7 (1982). The Soviet
Union has not yet concluded any bilateral agreement with the EEC. Note that East Ger-
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country concerned unilaterally declares" 12 that the agreement in no
way affects the status of Berlin as determined in the Quadripartite
Agreement. The territorial clause is not only of political significance
in relation to the Eastern European countries but also has legal con-
sequences because it allows physical and legal persons resident in
West Berlin to benefit from the international agreements entered
into by the EEC.
Clause 5 of the Joint Declaration simply states that by using the
normal wording of the EEC territorial clause, the Declaration applies
everywhere that the EEC Treaty applies, including West Berlin.' 3
As mentioned above, a unilateral statement was made at the time of
signature by the interested countries of the CMEA.1 14
The unilateral statement does not constitute a reservation" 5
since, if it did, it would purport to exclude or modify some of the
provisions of the Joint Declaration and hence there would be no con-
sensus ad idem and no treaty. It may be viewed as an interpretive dec-
laration, however.
Although territorial clauses have been inserted into agreements
with Eastern European countries prior to the conclusion of the Joint
Declaration, 16 it was important to the EEC that the Declaration with
the CMEA establish that it applies to West Berlin. This was a stick-
ing point for the CMEA and resulted in prolonged negotiations and,
ultimately, in the unilateral statement.
The Joint Declaration is silent on its territorial application to the
CMEA countries as is the CMEA Charter, save for references to
"member countries" and "in member countries," whatever the pre-
cise extent of the territories of these countries may be.
D. Authentic Languages of the Declaration
Clause 6 defines the authentic languages of the Declaration." 7
The French and Russian language versions of the Declaration have
been the basic texts for elaboration. The original texts of the Joint
Declaration were proposed and conveyed by the CMEA to the EC
Commission. The Declaration has been drawn up in all official lan-
guages of the EC as well as in all the languages of the member coun-
many benefits from the Protocol on German Internal Trade in that, inter alia, goods from
East Germany may freely enter the market of West Germany.
1 12 This is customarily known as the "Hungarian Formula."
I I Joint Declaration, supra note 10, cl. 5.
114 See supra text accompanying note 11.
115 The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as "a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or ac-
ceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna Convention, supra note
25, art. 2, para. 1(d).
It' 21 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) para. 1.5.3 (1988).
117 joint Declaration, supra note 10, cl. 6.
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tries of the CMEA," 1 8 all those texts being equally authentic. Article
33 of the Vienna Convention provides rules for the interpretation of
plurilingual treaties. 1 9 Difficulties between the Parties because of
the language differences seem to a great extent to have been re-
moved because the French, English, and Russian versions of the
Joint Declaration are quite uniform in their translations.120
V. Concluding Remarks
The EEC and the CMEA have followed the procedures and used
the powers entrusted to them to conclude a legally binding instru-
ment between themselves in the form of the Joint Declaration. In so
doing, their intention is beyond doubt. The CMEA's unilateral state-
ment appears superfluous from a legal point of view if the Parties
"only" had the intention to conclude a nonlegally binding docu-
ment. In addition, a legally binding instrument between the two or-
ganizations fits the EEC's parallel approach.
The question still remains whether the content of the Joint Dec-
laration lends itself to legal regulation. The answer appears to be
that it does. Although the objective could have been attained by less
exigent means,'21 the Declaration, a legally binding instrument, is a
proper form to use for the establishment of "official relations." With
respect to future cooperation between the parties, clauses 2, 3, and
4, express a legal commitment to designate representatives for this
purpose.' 2 2 In addition, clause 5, the territorial clause, is well-suited
to binding legal force.123
The Declaration is binding upon the Member States of the EEC
according to Article 228(2), but it does not bind the individual Mem-
ber States of the CMEA. The obvious implication is dejure recogni-
tion by EEC Member States of the CMEA as a legal entity subject to
public international law. This is not reciprocated by the CMEA
Member States to the EEC. The recognition of the EEC is estab-
lished through diplomatic relations between the EEC and those con-
tries. Of course, there was a great deal of coordination between the
signing of the Declaration and the applications by the CMEA Mem-
ber States for establishing diplomatic relations with the EEC.
The inclusion of the territorial clause in the Declaration implies
recognition by the CMEA of the application of the EEC Treaty to
West Berlin since the EEC Treaty extends itself to West Berlin and is
118 See id. The CMEA Charter has been concluded in the Russian language only.
CMEA Charter, supra note 74, art. XVIi.
119 Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 33.
120 The cohesion among the other languages of the Declaration has not been
examined.
121 Joint Declaration, supra note 10, cl. I.
122 Id.. cls. 2-4.
123 Id., cl. 5.
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actually applied there. Thus, the Declaration must apply to West
Berlin also. The Declaration is a bilateral agreement but is multilat-
eral in the sense that CMEA procedures for the approval of interna-
tional agreements implies that each individual CMEA country has
separately agreed to the territorial clause. This means that the So-
viet Union, in particular, no longer views the EEC Treaty as per se
incompatible with the status and security of West Berlin. The Soviet
Union has impliedly agreed to the extension of the EEC Treaty to
West Berlin just as with any treaty compatible with the Quadripartite
Agreement. The CMEA's unilateral statement then has the character
of a superfluous reminder that EEC law only applies to the extent it
is in conformity with the Quadripartite Agreement since the EEC
and the CMEA (and their Member States) have no power to change
that agreement in any respect.
The Joint Declaration is of little importance to the EEC with re-
gard to substantive matters, but it is an essential element of the par-
allel approach to establishment of normal relations with Eastern
Europe. The primary interest of the EEC is recognition by Eastern
European countries and the conclusion of trade agreements.124 For
the Soviets, the Joint Declaration will serve to strengthen the CMEA
from which internal political and economic advantages can be drawn.
The Joint Declaration will lead to economic gains for Eastern Euro-
pean countries by means of trade and cooperation agreements be-
tween the EEC and those countries, and bring (at least the smaller
countries) politically closer to Western Europe.
124 See 21 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) para. 1.5.5 (1988).
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APPENDIX
JOINT DECLARATION
on the establishment of official relations between the European Eco-
nomic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
of the one part, and
THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE,
of the other part,
HAVING REGARD to the acts establishing the European Economic
Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and in
particular the Treaty of Rome,
ON THE BASIS OF the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and taking account of the results of the sub-
sequent stages of the CSCE process,
DESIROUS of contributing, by the activities they pursue within their
fields of competence, to the further development of international
economic cooperation, an important factor in economic growth and
social progress, DECLARE as follows:
1. The European Economic Community and the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance establish official relations with each
other by adopting this Declaration.
2. The Parties will develop cooperation in areas which fall
within their respective spheres of competence and where there is a
common interest.
3. The areas, forms and methods of cooperation will be deter-
mined by the Parties by means of contacts and discussions between
their representatives designated for this purpose.
4. On the basis of the experience gained in developing cooper-
ation between them, the parties will, if necessary, examine the possi-
bility of determining new areas, forms and methods of cooperation.
5. As regards the application of this Declaration to the Com-
munity, it shall apply to the territories in which the Treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community is applied and under the
conditions laid down in that Treaty.
6. This Declaration is drawn up in duplicate in the Bulgarian,
Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Hungarian,
Italian, Mongolian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Spanish
and Vietnamese languages, each text being equally authentic.
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